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International Environmental Law:
Boundaries, Landmarks, and Realities
Lakshman Guruswamy

The

sources & Environment is an auspicious
occasion for reviewing U.S. environmental law. It also offers a felicitous opportunity to better understand that influential,
tenth anniversary
Natural
Re- envisometimes
awkward, of
cousin
of U.S.
ronmental law: international environmental law (IEL).
Once overshadowed by its prominent parents, national
environmental laws (including those of the United
States) and international law, this youthful and dynamic
subject has come of age in its own right. IEL now patrols an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world of expanding legal boundaries and is firmly
ensconced in the law school curriculum, even as practitioners and judges at all levels, come alive to its import and impact.
Historically, the United States believed that its domestic environmental laws could solve the problems
of the environment, largely because assaults on the
natural environment did not have or were not perceived as having much transnational impact or significance. The reality and perception have changed. Many
environmental problems such as global warming, the
endangered ozone layer, vanishing biodiversity, and
acid rain have outstripped the jurisdiction, outreach,
and grasp of the U.S. legal system, and require international solutions. Beginning with the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, in which the United
States played a prominent role, the world has come
alive to the importance of the new subject of international environmental law, boasting a corpus of nearly
300 multilateral treaties covering almost every environmental topic.
This article begins by defining IEL and tries to dispel some misconceptions about its jurisprudential nature. It then attempts to sketch the growth of IEL
through three historic landmarks: the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the World Commission on Environment and Development, and the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, paying particular attention to the dominant
chains of thinking that link these events. Finally, it considers one important treaty, The Convention on Biological Diversity, signed by 158 countries, that illuminates
the challenges, responses, and limitations of IEL.

Dr. Guruswamy is director,NationalEnergy Law & Policy
Institute and is professor of law at the University of Tulsa
College of Law.
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Defining IEL
Jurisprudentially and conceptually, IEL consists of
international law dealing with the environment as
found, primarily, in international agreements (also
called treaties, conventions or pacts), together with the
national and international mechanisms for implementing them; and secondarily, in international customary
law (the common law of the international community).
In other words IEL is located in international agreements or custom, rather than located in the statute
books and case law created by 187 national legislatures
and courts around the world. A study of the environmental laws of various nations that make up the international community falls within the jurisprudential
realm of comparative environmental law (CEL). That
subject, as distinct from IEL, subsumes laws governing
environmental questions, including air and water pollution, land use or conservation that are common to most
countries within the international legal system.
When faced with pollution problems it is, of
course, eminently desirable for one country to understand and study the extent to which it confronts common problems shared by other countries. Uniformities
of biophysical reactions are part of nature's writ that
runs ubiquitously and universally, and the laws of nature can give rise to identical biophysical reactions. If,
for example, the receiving medium is the same, discharges of wastes or residuals, whether in Los Angeles,
Liverpool, Dusseldorf, or Auckland, lead to pollution.
Common biophysical reactions take place regardless of
where in the world the environment is abused. Where
the necessary conditions exist, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide will react and result in acidic deposition in
the Ruhr, Northern England, or Ohio. Polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) act to cause cancers in West Virginia
in the same way as they do in Newcastle upon Tyne,
England, or Colombo, Sri Lanka.
While there is much to be learned from the common experiences of other countries, the miscellaneous
national laws controlling sulphur dioxide emissions and
acid rain or PCBs do not fall within the jurisprudential
province of IEL. The problems of acid rain or any other
pollutant enters the province of IEL only if it escapes
from national boundaries and becomes a transfrontier
problem by causing extraterritorial damage to another
country.
It is important to appreciate at this point that IEL is
a consensual law created by the freely exercised choice
of nation states that are members of the international
community. There is no law-making, law-altering legis-

lature, no law-implementing executive, and no system
of courts with compulsory jurisdiction of the kinds
found in national legal systems. Unlike the legal system
of the United States, or almost any other nation in
which laws are made, interpreted, and executed by legislatures, courts, and executives, IEL is a remarkably different "horizontal" or discretionary law. The creation of
IEL is dependent upon the comity of parties, rather
than dependent on "vertical" command and control of
legislatures and courts to which national lawyers are
accustomed.
The IEL invoked to deal with the transboundary effects of acid rain, for example, may be found in a treaty
negotiated between the concerned parties, or sometimes in existing customary norms applicable to the
issue. International treaties are like international contracts between states. Once party states have assumed
an obligation or agreed to act in a specified manner in
a treaty, they are bound to implement these provisions
within their respective national jurisdictions. If a treaty
dealing with acid rain required fitting scrubbers to remove sulfur from coal, the methods used to secure implementation of such an obligation are part of the
architecture of IEL. They could range from national legislation and administrative enforcement to monitoring,
reporting, and economic incentives.
The Stockholm Conference
on the Human Environment
The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, 1972 (Stockholm Conference), may well
have been the cocoon from which the chrysalis of international environmental law emerged as a legal subject in its own right, and it is helpful to recall what
was achieved at that international conference. Prior
to the Stockholm Conference, international environmental problems had been dealt with in a sporadic
and ad hoc manner, with a few, if varied, treaties dotting the landscape of international law. The development of IEL was influenced by the thinking, ideology,
and culture of concern about the environment worldwide just as environmental law was influenced in the
United States.
The themes articulated in Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring, Barry Commoner's Closing Circle, and the
Boulding's "spaceship earth," resonated internationally
in the thinking of other industrial nations. Many of
these themes, and then some, were melded and expressed with crusading cogency within an international
context in Limits to Growth, a computer-modeled
study sponsored by the Club of Rome, a private group
of industrialists and world leaders. The authors, Meadows and Meadows, painted an apocalyptic picture of
the exponential growth of population, pollution and
exhaustion of natural resources leading to a breakdown
of the carrying capacity of the earth. This book along
with many other phenomena such as acid rain, and the
poisoning of Japanese fisherman in Minimata bay, led
to a realization of the frailty of the planet Earth and created a ferment of apprehension among a cross-section
of common people, influential elites, and decisionmak-

ers in the developed industrial world.
In the face of these concerns, the United Nations
(U.N.) was moved to convene a special international
environmental conference in 1972 to discuss the
human environment. Sweden, which had begun to experience transboundary acid rain, volunteered to host
it in Stockholm. The overall sense of crisis crying out
for global action was brilliantly captured in the book by
Dubos and Ward, Only One Earth: The Care and
Maintenance of a Small Planet, specially commissioned for the Stockholm Conference.

Wile

concern about the environment mo-

tivated many rich, developed industrial
countries (DCs), the poor less-developed
countries (LDCs) did not share the view
that environmental degradation was the biggest threat
facing the planet. For the LDCs, poverty and the alleviation of misery remained a more poignant and real problem. And in the preparatory meetings leading to
Stockholm, the LDCs, who called themselves the
Group of 77 after their original number, used particularly sharp rhetoric to express the view that for them
the greatest pollution was caused by poverty. LDCs believed that greater development, with its concomitant
of resource use and pollution, was more important
than environmental pollution. They were particularly
scornful of the argument that DCs were solicitously trying to steer them away from the same pitfalls in which
DCs had fallen. LDCs expressed resentment that the
DCs, after consuming a great part of the earth's resources, devastatingly polluting the earth, and making
themselves rich, were now asking the LDCs to remain
poor, and more gallingly, to pay for the clean up,
restoration, and conservation of the earth. Many LDCs
feared, moreover, that new environmental standards
adopted by DCs would effectively bar the entry of their
goods into DC markets.
This ideological impasse presented a formidable
challenge to international environmental diplbmacy
and the question was resolved, as best it might, by
way of a compromise. The compromise worked out in
a meeting at Founex, near Geneva, Switzerland, recognized that economic development was not necessarily
incompatible with environmental protection, and that
development could proceed provided it avoided damaging the environment. The essence of the understanding was summed up in the Preamble to the Stockholm
Declaration. It stated that "... most of the environmental problems" of LDCs were caused by underdevelopment and that LDCs must direct their efforts to
development, with due regard to the priority to safeguard and improve the environment. Similarly, the industrialized countries were exhorted to make efforts
to reduce the gap between themselves and the developing countries. In sum, the LDCs successfully thwarted environmental laws and policies from damaging
their efforts to develop and grow economically,
whether by industrial progress or trade. They did not,
however, obtain substantial bankrolling, or pledges
thereof, to protect the global environment, nor did
they meaningfully advance the doctrine of "differenti-
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ated responsibility" that was later accepted at the
ror almost every concern that has been the subject of
Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
U.S. law or regulation including acid rain, hazardous
The Stockholm Conference, under the direction of
waste, ozone depletion, sea pollution from land and
its dynamic Secretary-General Maurice Strong, is regardvessels, toxics, resource conservation, and global
ed as perhaps the best documented, best organized
warming.
U.N. conference of its time. It may also be considered
as the cocoon from which the chrysalis of IEL emerged
World Commission on
for a number of reasons. First, the biosphere or the
Environment and Development
planet Earth was identified as an object and placed on
the agenda of national and international policy and law
Despite the uneasy truce at Founex, reflected in
in a way that had never been done before. The conferthe Stockholm Declaration, the persistent clash of two
ence was widely attended by 114 of the then-U.N.
cultures, environmental protection versus developmembership of 131. The Soviet bloc abstained from atment, continued to obstruct the development of IEL.
tending not because it rejected the purpose or mission
To resolve this problem the World Counission on
of the conference but because of the status accorded
Environment and Development (WCED or Brundtland
to East Germany. Second, the Stockholm Conference
Commission) was constituted by the U.N. General
resulted in the creation of the United Nations EnvironAssembly in 1983 and charged with proposing longment Program (UNEP), the first international organizaterm environmental strategies for "sustainable develoption with an exclusive environmental mandate. UNEP
ment." That elusive term was not defined by the United
has been instrumental in drafting, facilitating and negoNations, and despite the efforts of the Brundtland Comtiating a number of environmental treaties. Third, the
mission and the Earth Summit, still eludes satisfactory
Stockholm Conference produced a
definition. After four years of deconference declaration of twenty-six
liberation, worldwide consultaprinciples (Stockholm Declaration)
tion, and study, the Brundtland
that addressed the rights and obligaThe Stockhc )lm Conference report, Our Common Future, artions of citizens and governments
ticulated the paradigm on which
with regard to the preservation
the Earth Summit, and indeed IEL,
and improvement of the environis rc ga rded
has since been based. In essence,
ment. Apart from the Stockholm
it rejected the despairing thesis
Declaration generally considered
)cumented
that environmental problems were
an instrument of IEL in that it either
as the besi
past repair, spiralling out of concrystallized or generated customary
trol, and could only be averted by
law, the conference also created an
and o'rgc?nized
'no growth" that arrested developaction plan containing recommendament and economic growth. Intions for future implementation.
stead, it argued that economic
U.N. c oniference
A number of specific principles
growth was both desirable and
of the Stockholm Declaration bear
possible within a context of susmention. Principles 1, 2, and 5, adof i,ts t ime.
tainable development.
dressing responsibilities to future
Although sustainable developgenerations, are undergirded by an
ment was not clearly defined, key
obligation to conserve. Principle 1,
attributes are identifiable from the
albeit counterbalanced by Principle
many descriptions of it. It calls for
11, recognized a nascent right to a quality environdevelopmental policies in which environmental protecment. Principle 21 referred to the right of a state to extion constitutes an integral part, and for economic
ploit its resources pursuant to their environmental (not
growth that can relieve the great poverty of the LDCs.
developmental) policies, and affirmed their obligation
Such development and growth should be based on polinot to cause transboundary injury. This was followed
cies that sustain and expand the environmental reby Principle 22 positing that states shall cooperate to
source base in a manner that meets the needs of the
develop international law regarding liability and compresent generation without compromising the ability of
pensation for extraterritorial harm.
future generations to meet their own needs. Brundtland
These principles have been reinstitutionalized in
Commission, 8. To draw up a global plan for sustainmany post-Stockholm agreements. For example, Princiable development, the Brundtland Commission report
ple 21 has been incorporated in a wide range of
called for an international conference that would act as
treaties including: the Convention on Biological Diversithe successor to the Stockholm Conference, and carry
ty, 1992; the Vienna Convention for the Protection of
its legacy forward.
the Ozone Layer, 1985; the Convention on Long-Range
The U.N. General Assembly did so, and directed
Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979; the Agreement on
the United Nations Conference on Environment and
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
Development (UNCED or Earth Summit) to take ac1985; and the United Nations Convention on the Law
count, inter alia, of the Stockholm Declaration and
of the Sea, 1982. Furthermore, the post-Stockholm
further develop IEL. An ambitious agenda was drawn
world has spawned a prolific number of environmental
up for the Earth Summit that included (1) an Earth
treaties. Over one hundred post-Stockholm treaties mirCharter that would be the successor to the Stockholm

td(
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Declaration; (2) an action plan for the planet called
Agenda 21; and (3) the ceremonial signing of two
conventions addressing with climate change and
biodiversity.

United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, 1992

tal needs of present and future generations" (Principle
3). Disappointingly, this reformulation impliedly
negates or weakens the obligation to conserve expressed in Stockholm. Finally, the Rio Declaration
frowns upon action such as that taken by the United
States, under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C. §5 1362-1421h, to prevent the slaughter of dolphins by prohibiting imports of tuna caught in
dolphin killing nets. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration
states that "unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country should be avoided." While the substantive
shortcomings of the Rio Declaration do not necessarily
restrict the further development of IEL, the damaging
potential of the Rio Declaration is illustrated by one of
the major treaties ceremoniously signed in Rio, and it is
to that treaty that we now turn.

The Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in June
1992 and attended by over 180 countries and 100 heads
of state, has been heralded as the greatest summit-level
conference in history. It resulted in (1) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; (2) Agenda 21;
(3) the Nonlegally Binding Authoritative Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types
of Forests; and (4) the ceremonial signing of the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions.
Post Earth Summit assessments have, for differing
Convention on Biological Diversity
reasons, been generally favorable, while a few tend to
A
familiar, nonetheless frightening scenario, debe almost unreservedly laudatory, even euphoric. Later
present as an age of mass extinction rivaling
the
picts
cast
to
more considered evaluations are beginning
the Cretaceous extinction 66 million years ago when
doubts on these reviews, and this article does not offer
12 percent of the species resident on earth disappeared
a studied and documented appraisal of that event. Inspasmodic catastrophe. This apocalyptic vision
in
stead, it very briefly advances some conclusions and
within the context of exponential population
emerges
then illustrates the extent to which these conclusions
growth, in which global population was 2.515 billion
are borne out in the Biodiversity Convention.
in 1950, exploded to 5.291 billion
In the view of this writer, the
in 1990, and is estimated to rise to
legal results of the Earth Summit
6.251 by the year 2000. The figures
were, at best, mottled. The Earth
refer to human beings who must
Summit undoubtedly was a great
be fed, clothed, and housed. In
The Eartb' ummit
platform for environmental proteccompounding this increase with
tion but its contribution to IEL was
the further stress placed on forests,
as
-alded
been
has
more apparent than real. While it
be
wetlands, and coral reefs by an
did draw universal attention to enimproved standard of living and
vironmental protection and raised
continued economic growth, comthe greatest su mmit-level
many issues onto the global agenmentators have commonly arrived
da, what was substantively
conferen
achieved at the Earth Summit apart
at one conclusion: biodiversity is
~e nl hZstory,
being destroyed and extinctions are
from the Climate Convention was
increasing inexorably.
unimpressive. To begin, the intendThe United Nations Convention
ed "Earth Charter" was replaced by
on Biological Diversity (Conventhe "Rio Declaration on Environtion), ceremoniously signed at the
ment and Development" (Rio Decheralded chapter in internamuch
is
a
Summit,
Earth
laration), a title that diminished the environmental
at arresting this trend. Aldirected
legislation
tional
the
Second,
resonance and status of that document.
though envisioned as a comprehensive law that would
principles themselves set a dubious foundation for IEL,
remedy the fragmented and regional approach to biodiand effectively turned the clock back from Stockholm.
versity protection evident in earlier treaty making, the
For example, the nascent right to a wholesome environConvention has belied these expectations, and may halt
abanwas
ment embodied in the Stockholm Declaration
the advance of IEL on three fronts.
doned in favor of a right to development (Principle 2).
First, it rejects the concept of sustainable developThe obligation not to cause transfrontier damage conby prioritizing economic growth over environment
tained in Principle 21 of Stockholm was weakened in
protection, and allows international resources
mental
of
cruthe
addition
by
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
earmarked for the protection of biodiversity to be excial language authorizing states "to exploit their own
pended on economic growth that could destroy biodinatural resources pursuant to their own environmental
versity. Second, it denies state responsibility for
and developmental policies." (Emphasis added).
damage to the global commons. Finally, it repudiates
to
duty
by
the
implied
conserve
to
obligation
The
the idea that the plant, animal, insect and genetic reprotect the environment for the benefit of future gensources of the world (our biodiversity) are the common
erations found in Stockholm is replaced in the Rio Decheritage of humankind and that it is the responsibility
laration by a right to consume or develop. The Rio
of the community of nations to protect this heritage.
environmenand
to
"developmental
refers
formulation
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Before embarking on this brief exegesis, it is imwhat problems did they confront? And second, how
portant to point out that the Convention does not bewilling were they to take legal measures-measures to
long to the "soft" law genus of Agenda 21 and the Rio
the extent possible that are binding and enforceable in
Declaration, or the "nonlegally binding" category of the
the international arena as statutes are under municipal'
Forestry Principles and should be judged on its own
law-to address these problems? While the Conventerms: as a species of "hard" treaty law. For the limited
tion articulated the nature of the challenge caused by
vanishing biodiversity, it set its face against remedying
purpose of this piece the main difference between
the problems and even turned the clock back on nu"hard" and "soft" law lies in the way norms, expectamerous developments in international environmental
tions, or consensus among the parties are expressed or
articulated. Soft laws often express themselves as politipolicy and law.
cal statements, values, and exhortations as distinct from
To begin, the Convention rejects the concept of
binding rules and clear standards that are justiciable.
sustainable development-the very groundnorm of the
The very fact that such a distinction is recognized and
Earth Summit. Sustainable development has not been
acted upon is ground enough for asauthoritatively defined, but as we
serting that hard law is distinguishhave seen, it seeks at its core to
able from soft law, and nonlegally
strike a balance between developbinding documents. It is precisely
ment and environmental protecbecause they were aware of these
The C(onV'ention
tion, thus giving parity of status to
distinctions that the lawmakers at
economic growth and the environRio created three different types of
ment. It rejects economic developinstruments.
rejects 1he concept
ment and growth that is not
If the distinction between nonenvironmentally sensitive or delegally binding principles, hortatory
of
nable
stroys the resource base, and is a
;tai
declarations, and obligatory laws
new concept precisely because it
are to mean anything, however,
embraces both development and
hard treaty law protecting biodiverdeve
environmental protection.
nent.
sity, as distinct from soft law or
Despite this, the Convention
nonlegally binding instruments,
states both in its preamble and in
ought to embody legally recognizcritical articles dealing with the fiable duties, obligations, and rights
nancing of the Convention that
"economic and social development and the poverty
pertaining to the protection of biodiversity. To say this
is not to diminish or detract from other social forces
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of dethat can act more effectively and efficiently than law to
veloping countries." Preamble and Article 20(4). The
solve problems, or even avoid those problems ex ante.
tenor and force of these provisions subdue, if not canIncreasing knowledge and awareness about the dangers
cel, the weak clauses in the preamble "reaffirming conof extinction, educational campaigns, appeals to ethics,
servation," and the "use of "biological resources in a
equity, morals, economic incentives, and market mechsustainable manner." Not only is biodiversity subjected
anisms could preserve biodiversity without being instito the preeminence of development, but the interpretatutionalized as law. But there may also be felt societal
tion of development is left to be determined subjectiveneeds for establishing legal rights, duties, and obligaly by developing countries. By any analysis, this
tions to complement, facilitate, empower, or harness
formulation elevates development and diminishes biodithe use of social mechanisms and techniques.
versity and by doing so effectively disowns sustainable
Once it is determined by lawmakers that they want
development.
to create hard treaty laws, it is essential that they careThis diminution of biodiversity and accentuation of
fully craft the substance, content, and form of such
development is confirmed by the financial provisions.
rights and duties. International laws, like all laws, reTo enable LDCs to implement the Convention, develflect the minds and intentions of their lawmakers. The
oped countries agree both to pay the "full incremental
precision, extent, and force of legal prescriptions in
costs. . ." of such implementation, Article 20(2), and to
treaties are the product of human design, not accident.
transfer technology to LDCs, Article 16. An examination
The weight of a legal obligation, duty, or right will deof the commitments of developing countries, in expend on the extent to which it commands or demands
change for this transfer of money and technology, is reactions, and cures the perceived mischief by advancing
vealing. Having earlier made the point that economic
a remedy. In assessing the Convention, therefore, it is
and social development and eradication of poverty are
useful to identify the main concerns and problems
the first and overriding priorities of developing counabout biodiversity that the Convention was meant to
tries, the Convention develops a logical implementing
address and then to inquire if the remedies offered by
structure. The institutional structures as well as the
"policy, strategy, programme priorities and eligibility
the Convention help solve these problems.
While the factors that influence and mold the
criteria relating to . . ." access to those transferred remindset and intentions of lawmakers will continue to
sources and technologies will be determined by the
be the subject of perennial inquiry, there can be little
Conference of the Parties to the Convention. Article 21.
debate that two critical questions faced the internaWhere does this leave us? In the absence of an extional community when forging the Convention. First,
plicit commitment to protect biodiversity, any re-

lopr
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Although the collective obligation to protect biodiversity was seen by the UNEP, the IUCN, and numerous other nongovernmental organizations as constituting the foundations of the new treaty, the Convention
rejects such an obligation and instead proclaims that
states have the "sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies...... " Article 3. In similar vein, the convention rejects the principle that biodiversity is the natural
heritage of humankind.
The natural heritage of humankind is to be distinguished from the common heritage of mankind (CHM)
that has been applied to the deep-sea bed and the
ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction by
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Articles 133, 136 and 156-169, and the outer space regime
respectively, Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and to Other Celestial Bodies, Article 11(1). At its core the CHM involves inclusive enjoyment and sharing of the products
of the common heritage, and its
thrust remains redistribution not
conservation. The essential feature
of CHM, whether based on res
CHM is not a
communis or res publica, is the
entitlement of the entire internaconservationi.st principle
tional community to exploit the
sea bed and share the fruits of exploitation. CHM is not a conservabecause it*is directed to
tionist principle because it is
resource
to maximizing
directed
exploitation
and economic
returns.
maximi2ing;resource

sources transferred under the Convention could be
used by a small minority of zealous developing countries to advance their own concept of economic and
social development. If, for example, they decide that
road building, "reclamation" for beach development
and marinas, or even the cutting down of tropical
forests are necessary for economic and social development, they would be acting within the powers and
privileges granted to them.
A somewhat foreboding omen of the future direction of the Convention is offered by its treatment of
tropical rain forests. It is estimated that tropical forests
are home to at least 50 percent of plant and insect diversity. Yet all references to tropical forests were systematically, and deliberately excised from the
Convention. The World Conservation Union (IUCN)
drafts attempted to protect tropical and rain forests by
including the principle, carried right through to the
Fifth Revised Draft Convention, that states are responsible "for the conservation and sustainable use of their biological

resources." Article 3(2)(a) of the
Fifth Revised Draft Convention on
Biological Diversity, Feb. 20, 1992,
UNEP/bio.div/N7-INC.5/2. This
principle was excised from the

Convention and replaced, instead,
by one that asserts the sovereign
right of states to exploit their own
resources subject to the duty not to
cause extraterritorial harm. Article
3. To summarize, the first flaw of
Moreover, it is so suffused in tradithe Convention is that it underexploitati on and
tional nonconservationist resource
mines the environmental emphasis
economics as to render it constitufound in the concept of "sustaintionally incapable of nurturing a
able development."
jic
returns,
regime of sustainable developeconon
tilts
Second, the Convention
ment.
against an emerging and developing
The attempt in the Food and
pattern of regional customary and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) to
treaty laws, that has, in the last fifty
secure an International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
or so years, sought to establish the common responsiResources was based on genetic resources being acinThey
biodiversity.
protect
to
bility of humankind
cepted as "a heritage of mankind." If the FAO did atclude for example: the Declaration of the United
tempt to bring plant genetic resources within that
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972,
rubric, their attempt did not improve the conservationPreamble and Principles 1, 2, 4, 5; Convention for the
ist credentials of CHM. The FAO undertaking involves
Heritage,
and
Natural
Cultural
World
of
the
Protection
the repudiation of property rights from all
1972, Articles 4 and 6; The Bern Convention on the
germplasm-both natural and improved-including geConservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habinetically engineered plants, seed, and tissue culture.
tats, 1979, Preamble and Articles 3, 4, 5-9 and 13; the
But it is clear that the thrust of the agreement is exploApia Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the
ration and utilization rather than conservation. By conSouth Pacific, 1976; the ASEAN Convention on the
trast, the "natural heritage of humankind" refers to the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1985;
biological necessities of the world, necessary for the
the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas,
existence and development of all humankind, that may
1982; and the Protocol on the Conservation of Comfall within the national jurisdiction of states. Accepting
mon Natural Resources, 1982. Many involved in the debiodiversity as our common natural heritage gives rise
velopment of international environmental law hoped
to the corollary obligation that we protect and preserve
that the Biodiversity Convention would consolidate
such a heritage. Instead the Convention settles for an
these endeavors, and provide an instrument that dealt
effete and legally nonbinding recitation that biodiversicomprehensively, globally, and more specifically with
ty is the common "concern" of humankind. Furtherthe nature of the obligation to protect biodiversity. Inmore, the attenuated affirmation that "biological
stead, the Convention contains no substantive obliga(Continued on page 76)
tion to protect biodiversity.
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regulatory sphere is a policy matter to argue with Congress and not one to undo through statutory interpretation by the judiciary. The view that the perceived
problems did not justify federal intrusion lost in Congress in 1977. Perhaps if revisited in Congress in 1995,
the outcome would be different. Furthermore, to the
extent that matters lie within the Administrator's discretion (as contrasted with a mandate from Congress),
another avenue for change is available. That this is a viable process is illustrated by the changes the Secretary
promulgated in 1988 and upheld in National Coal As-

sociation v. InteriorDepartment,39 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1624 (D.D.C. 1994). Although the Secretary rejected a request to repeal a regulation providing for
federal notices of violation during state primacy, the
Secretary in 1988, adopting several reforms suggested
by the Mining Reclamation Council of America, made
several important changes to the process for issuing
those notices of violation. 53 Fed. Reg. 26,744 (1988),
amending 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2).
Under Chevron, Congress and the Administrator
are the preferred arenas.

International Environmental Law
(Continuedfrom page 48)
diversity is the common concern of humankind" is
found only in the Preamble, even though it ranked as a
Fundamental Principle throughout the drafting process.
Even when the Convention attempts to protect biological diversity by in-situ conservation, ex-situ conservation and sustainable use in Article 6 through Article
14, it provides that every obligation assumed (except
those related to research and training) yields to the
caveat: "as far as possible and as appropriate." Furthermore, Article 7, addressing the key elements of identification and monitoring, allows each contracting party to
make such identification. This contrasts with earlier expectations and drafts that provided for the establishment of Global Lists of Biogeographic Areas of
Particular Importance for the Conservation of Biological Diversity and of Species Threatened with Extinction
on a Global Scale to be internationally, not nationally,
determined.
Any obligations to protect the common heritage of
humankind need not fall disproportionately on the
poor and the deprived. Given the enormous disparities
of wealth among nations, equity, fairness, and efficiency require that discharging the burden of protection
should fall differentially and more heavily on the richer
nations. Biological diversity is a public good that is of
critical importance to all humanity and ought to be protected by the entire international community. In the absence of a system of international government that can
act to protect public goods for collective benefit, other
mechanisms should be found. One fecund suggestion is
to give areas of biodiversity a designated value and to
pay the owner country an interest or financial allotment for the conservation or preservation of such
areas. The burden of such payments should be proportionately heavier for the richer nations.
It is also clear that the duty to preserve huge extents of forest, marsh, or coral reefs rich in biological
diversity could entail daunting opportunity costs to
LDCs. For example, an obligation to protect rain forests
placed on LDCs is tantamount to denying those LDCs
the right to cut down and develop such forests, to provide land, housing, and food to their desperately poor
populace. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to devise
measures and mechanisms to ameliorate the costs
borne by LDCs.' Unfortunately, the Convention does

not confirm the responsibility of the community of nations to protect biodiversity, and it even appears to reject such a conclusion. This is a grievous defect, and
the second flaw of the Convention.
Third, the challenge facing the Convention was to
extend state responsibility for extraterritorial harm to
damage caused to the global commons. As we have
seen, the principle of state responsibility for extraterritorial harm has been accepted as international law
since at least the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. It has
subsequently been affirmed in numerous other treaties
and instruments (e.g., U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (1982); Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (1992); and the World Charter for Nature
(1982)). The global commons may include the critical
habitats or homes of life forms physically located within the territorial jurisdiction of nation states. But such
an extension of state responsibility was roundly rejected by the Convention, and its application has been
strictly confined to extraterritorial damage. The Fifth
Revised Draft Convention had asserted the principle
that states are responsible "for the conservation and
sustainable use of their biological resources." That
statement has been banished from the Principles.
What emerges is a deeply flawed Convention that
fails to live up to expectations: one that very nearly interdicts the obligation to protect biodiversity, fails to
institutionalize the principle of differentiated responsibility, and rejects sustainable development. The conclusion that the Convention flounders in holding the ring
between the global need for biological diversity and
the sovereign right of states to control and develop
their own resources is a somber conclusion.

Rio and Beyond
The fact that the Earth Summit may have been a
step backward for IEL needs to be understood in the
context of the inherent weaknesses of IEL. First, there
is no foundational multilateral treaty that gives international environmental protection the character, weight,
or force, for example, of free trade as established by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Nor is there any one international organization that supervises the application of international environmental
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law similar to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
environmental appeasers, who seem politically coded
that services and implements GATT. IEL is fragmented
toward capitulating to ecological aggression. On the
and uncoordinated, and UNEP does not possess the
other hand, a blinkered U.S. Senate may still reject
authority or the resources to act as the global environsuch an initiative. Nonetheless, they must be presentmental counterpart of WTO. Second, IEL is a consensued with a plan to save the world's tropical forests and
al law that is created and implemented by the states it
be seen to repudiate a serious effort to conserve the
regulates. Third, there is no legislative body to create
gene banks of the planet.
the law, no executive agency to implement it, and no
Second, it is impossible to devise any strategy
judicial body to interpret or enforce the law.
without a global financial commitment to sustainable
These shortcomings give rise to the need for interdevelopment. A commitment to sustainable developnational environmental laws that are clear and precise.
ment will embrace precisely the kind of financial and
Given the competing and conflicting positions of the
technology transfers that the United States has es187 nations of the world, it is apparent that nations
chewed until now. This is not an easy task for the
will only feel legally bound by international environClinton administration that has signed the Convention
mental laws that create binding obligations, as distinct
but faces a hostile Congress. The administration must
from exhortational and aspirational declarations. To say
demonstrate that the real dollars invested in protecting
this is not to diminish, but only to distinguish from law,
biodiversity will result in real gains. To do so it must
nonbinding declarations, codes of
convince a myopic U.S. Congress
conduct, morality, ethics or relithat resource transfers will be digion, and other wellsprings of conrected toward the-protection of
duct. Lawmaking in the
The ad nin istration
biodiversity, not some enterprise
international legal system, just like
within the "developmental" disany other, is the product of the uncretion of the recipient nation.
derlying sociopolitical realities of
must den,ion,,strate that
Given the confusing state of the
ideology, politics, and self interest.
financial arrangements under the
All these shortcomings do not
the real d()lla:rs invested
Convention, this could only be
necessarily imply that the future is a
accomplished if the United States
bleak one. It is reasonable to addirects its full diplomatic efforts
dress the shortcomings of the Earth
in p' rote cting
toward transforming the proceSummit on a case-by-case basis bedures under the Convention, draftginning with the Biodiversity Conbiodivers;
ing separate protocols, or by
ity vill result
vention. It is still possible to
reforming the manner of its implereinvent that treaty if the United
mentation.
States were to play a critical role
in re alg rains.
On a more general level, there
and questions arise as to the nature
is little one can do to deal with
of the U.S. role and the strategies to
the constitutional weaknesses of
be employed. These will be sparingIEL arising from the absence of
ly sketched. First, the primary aim
lawmaking, law-changing, impleof any strategy must remain a World Forestry Convenmenting, and interpretive agencies. The process of
tion. Such a convention should protect old forests, partreaty implementation has to proceed consensually,
ticularly tropical forests, that are home to up to 50
but the mechanisms and institutions from implementpercent of the plant and insect biological diversity of
ing IEL must remain its highest priority. In this context
the world. The administration should use Senate apthe restrictions imposed by GATT on environmental
proval as the mechanism for reaching accord on such a
trade measures must cause concern. It is time for IEL
Convention.
to consider a single international environmental orgaThough the Bush administration rejected any atnization with the stature and power of the WTO. A
tempts to bring U.S. old growth forests under the pronew World Environmental Organization is surely nectective umbrella of a World Forestry Convention, the
essary not only to countervail a trade organization that
Clinton administration appears ready to do so. Using
dominates international relations but more importantly
the new U.S. policy as a bargaining chip for a larger into implement IEL. Concurrently, it is necessary to conternational commitment toward preserving biodiversisider how to move the IEL disputes that intermesh
ty may also have the additional benefit of convincing
with trade issues out of the dispute settlement procea hostile new U.S. Congress that this is not another
dures of GATT into a neutral forum, such as the Inter"sellout" to corrupt Third World countries. The United
national Court of Justice.
States should abandon its meaningless silence on the
IEL is sufficiently mature to withstand the legal setloss of tropical forests, and conduct a strong diplomatbacks, yet act positively to harvest the psychological
ic and political campaign for a World Forestry Convenimpetus and international goodwill sown by the Earth
tion. Such a move may also be the only practical way
Summit. The next ten-year review of NaturalReof securing the approval of the U.S. Senate for the
sources & Environment in 2005 may look back on the
Convention. Doing so might invoke the ire of a minorilegal setbacks at Rio as a strategic retreat that spurred
ty of developing countries set on aggressive and mindthe international community, and its lawyers, to greater
less development, along with a few misdirected
efforts and results.
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